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Abstract
We consider settings in which the right notion of fairness is not captured by simple mathematical
definitions (such as equality of error rates across groups), but might be more complex and nuanced
and thus require elicitation from individual or collective stakeholders. We introduce a framework in
which pairs of individuals can be identified as requiring (approximately) equal treatment under a
learned model, or requiring ordered treatment such as “applicant Alice should be at least as likely to
receive a loan as applicant Bob”. We provide a provably convergent and oracle efficient algorithm for
learning the most accurate model subject to the elicited fairness constraints, and prove generalization
bounds for both accuracy and fairness. This algorithm can also combine the elicited constraints
with traditional statistical fairness notions, thus “correcting” or modifying the latter by the former.
We report preliminary findings of a behavioral study of our framework using human-subject fairness
constraints elicited on the COMPAS criminal recidivism dataset.
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1 Introduction
The literature on algorithmic fairness has consisted largely of researchers proposing and
showing how to impose technical definitions of fairness [18, 32, 66, 3, 4, 34, 60, 48, 29, 26, 4, 14].
Because these imposed notions of fairness are described analytically, they are typically
simplistic, and often have the form of equalizing simple error statistics across groups. Our
starting point is the observation that:
1. This process cannot result in notions of fairness that do not have any simple, analytic
description, and
2. This process also overlooks a more precursory problem: namely, who gets to define what
is fair?
It’s unlikely that researchers alone are best fit for defining algorithmic fairness. Recent
work identifies undue power imbalances [40] and biases [39] that arise when algorithm
designers and researchers are the only voices in conversations around ethical design. [59]
find that many machine learning practitioners are disconnected from the “organisational
© Christopher Jung, Michael Kearns, Seth Neel, Aaron Roth, Logan Stapleton, and Zhiwei Steven Wu;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY 4.0
2nd Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2021).
Editors: Katrina Ligett and Swati Gupta; Article No. 2; pp. 2:1–2:19
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Dagstuhl Publishing, Germany
2:2 Fairness Elicitation
and institutional realities, constraints and needs” specific to the contexts in which their
algorithms are applied. Researchers may not be able to propose a concise technical definition,
e.g. statistical parity, to capture the nuances of fairness in any given context. Furthermore,
many philosophers hold that stakeholders who are affected by moral decisions and experts
who understand the context in which moral decisions are made will have the best judgment
about which decisions are fair in that context [63, 39].
To this end, we aim to allow stakeholders and experts to play a central role in the process
of defining algorithmic fairness. This is aligned with recent works on virtual democracy,
which propose and enact participatory methods to automate moral decision-making [13, 51,
31, 46, 21].
The way we involve stakeholders is motivated by two concerns:
1. We want stakeholders to have free rein over how they may define fairness, e.g. we don’t
want to simply have them vote on whether existing, simple constraints like statistical
parity or equalized odds is best; and
2. We want non-technical stakeholders to be able to contribute, even if they may not
understand the inner workings of a learning algorithm.
We hold that people often cannot elucidate their conceptions of fairness; yet, they can
identify specific scenarios where fairness or unfairness occurs.1 Drawing from individual
notions of fairness like [17, 29] that are defined in terms of pairwise comparisons, we therefore
aim to elicit stakeholders conceptions of fairness by asking them to compare pairs of individuals
in specific scenarios. Specifically, we ask whether it’s fair that one particular individual
should receive an outcome that is as desirable or better than the other.
When pointing out fairness or unfairness, this kind of pairwise ranking is natural. For
example, after Serena Williams was penalized for a verbal interaction with an umpire in the
2018 U.S. Open Finals, tennis player James Blake tweeted, “I have said worse and not gotten
penalized. And I’ve also been given a “soft warning” by the ump where they tell you knock it
off or I will have to give you a violation. [The umpire] should have at least given [Williams]
that courtesy” [65]. Here, Blake thinks that: 1) Williams should have been judged as or less
severely than he would have been in a similar situation; and 2) the umpire’s decision was
unfair, because Williams was judged more severely.
Thus, we ask a set of stakeholders about a fixed set of pairs of individuals subject to a
classification problem. For each pair of individuals (A, B), we ask the stakeholder to choose
from amongst a set of four options:
1. Fair outcomes must classify A and B the same way (i.e. they must either both get a
favorable classification or both get an unfavorable classification).
2. Fair outcomes must give A an outcome that is equal to or preferable to the outcome of B.
3. Fair outcomes must give B an outcome that is equal to or preferable to the outcome of A
4. Fair outcomes may treat A and B differently without any constraints.
These constraints, a data distribution, and a hypothesis class define a learning problem:
minimize classification error subject to the constraint that the rate of violation of the elicited
pairwise constraints is held below some fixed threshold. Crucially and intentionally we elicit
relative pairwise orderings of outcomes (e.g. A and B should be treated equally), but do not
elicit preferences for absolute outcomes (e.g. A should receive a positive outcome). This is
1 This is philosophically akin to a theory of moral epistemology called moral perception, which claims
that we know moral facts (e.g. goodness or fairness) via perception, as opposed to knowing them via
rules of morality (see [10]).
C. Jung, M. Kearns, S. Neel, A. Roth, L. Stapleton, and Z. S. Wu 2:3
because fairness – in contrast to justice – is often conceptualized as a measure of equality
of outcomes, rather than correctness of outcomes2. In particular, it remains the job of the
learning algorithm to optimize for correctness subject to elicited fairness constraints.
We remark that the premise (and the foundation for the enormous success) of machine
learning is that accurate decision making rules in complex scenarios cannot be defined with
simple analytic rules, and instead are best derived directly from data. Our work can be viewed
similarly, as deriving fairness constraints from data elicited from experts and stakeholders.
In this paper, we solve the computational, statistical, and conceptual issues necessary to do
this, and demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach via a small behavioral study.
1.1 Results
Our Model
We model individuals as having features in X and binary labels, drawn from some distribution
P . A committee of stakeholders3 u ∈ U has preferences about whether one individual should
be judged better than another individual. We imagine presenting each stakeholder with a
set of pairs of individuals and asking them to choose one of four options for each pair, e.g.
given the features of Serena Williams and Jacob Blake:
1. No constraint;
2. Williams should be treated as well as Blake or better;
3. Blake should be treated as well as Williams or better; or
4. Williams and Blake should be treated similarly.
Here, when we refer to how an individual should be treated, we mean the probability that an
individual is given a positive label by the classifier. This may be a bit of a relaxation of these
judgments, since they are not about actualized classifications, but rather the probabilities of
positive classification. For example, we may not consider it a violation of fairness preference
(2) if Williams is judged worse than Blake in a specific scenario; yet, if an ump is more
likely to judge Williams worse than Blake in general, then this would violate this fairness
preference.
We represent these preferences abstractly as a set of ordered pairs Cu ⊆ X ×X for each
stakeholder u. If (x, x′) ∈ Cu, this means that stakeholder u believes that individual x′ must
be treated as well as individual x or better, i.e. ideally the classifier h classifies such that
h(x′) ≥ h(x). This captures all possible responses above. For example, for Serena Williams
(s) and Jacob Blake (b), if stakeholder u responds:
1. No constraint ⇔ (s, b) ̸∈ Cu nor (b, s) ̸∈ Cu;
2. Williams as well as Blake ⇔ (b, s) ∈ Cu;
3. Blake as well as Williams ⇔ (s, b) ∈ Cu; or
4. Treated similarly ⇔ (s, b) ∈ Cu and (b, s) ∈ Cu (since if h(b) ≥ h(s) and h(s) ≥ h(b),
then h(s) = h(b)).
2 Sidney Morgenbesser, following the Columbia University campus protests in the 1960s, reportedly said
that the police had treated him unjustly, but not unfairly. He said that he was treated unjustly because
the police hit him without provocation – but not unfairly, because the police were doing the same to
everyone else as well.
3 Though we develop our formalism as a committee of stakeholders, note that it permits the special case
of a single subjective stakeholder, which we make use of in our behavioral study.
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We impose no structure on how stakeholders form their views nor on the relationship
between the views of different stakeholders – i.e. the sets {Cu}u∈U are allowed to be arbitrary
(for example, they need not satisfy a triangle inequality), and need not be mutually consistent.
We write C = ∪uCu.
We then formulate an optimization problem constrained by these pairwise fairness
constraints. Since it is intractable to require that all constraints in C be satisfied exactly,
we formulate two different “knobs” with which we can quantitatively relax our fairness
constraints.
For γ > 0 (our first knob), we say that the classification of an ordered pair of individuals
(x, x′) ∈ C satisfies γ-fairness if the probability of positive classification for x′ plus γ is
no smaller than the probability of positive classification for x, i.e. E[h(x′)] + γ ≥ E[h(x)].
In this expression, the expectation is taken only over the randomness of the classifier h.
Equivalently, a γ-fairness violation corresponds to the classification of an ordered pair of
individuals (x, x′) ∈ C if the difference between these probabilities of positive classification
is greater than γ, i.e. E[h(x)− h(x′)] > γ. Thus, γ acts as a buffer on how likely it is that
x′ be classified worse than x before a fairness violation occurs. For example, if Blake (b)
receives a good label (i.e. no penalty) 80% of the time and Williams (s) 50% of the time,
then for γ = 0.1 this constitutes a γ-fairness violation for the ordered pair (b, s) ∈ C, since
E[h(b)− h(s)] = 0.3 ≥ 0.1 = γ.
We might ask that for no pair of individuals do we have a γ-fairness violation:
max
(x,x′)∈C
E[h(x)− h(x′)] ≤ γ.
On the other hand, we could ask for the weaker constraint that over a random draw
of a pair of individuals, the expected fairness violation is at most η (our second knob):
E(x,x′)∼P2 [(h(x) − h(x′)) · 1[(x, x′) ∈ C]] ≤ η. We can also combine both relaxations to
ask that the in expectation over random pairs, the “excess” fairness violation, on top of an
allowed budget of γ, is at most η. For example, as above, if Blake receives a good label 80%
of the time and Williams 50%, for γ = 0.1, the umpire classifier would pick up 0.2 excess
fairness violation for (b, s) ∈ C. In Section 2, we weight these excess fairness violations by the
proportion of stakeholders who agree with the corresponding fairness constraint and mandate
their sum be less than η. Subject to these constraints, we would like to find the distribution
over classifiers that minimizes classification error: given a setting of the parameters γ and η,
this defines a benchmark with which we would like to compete.
Our Theoretical Results
Even absent fairness constraints, learning to minimize 0/1 loss (even over linear classifiers) is
computationally hard in the worst case (see e.g. [20, 19]). Despite this, learning seems to
be empirically tractable in the real world. To capture the additional hardness of learning
subject to fairness constraints, we follow several recent papers [2, 33] in aiming to develop
oracle efficient learning algorithms. Oracle efficient algorithms are assumed to have access to
an oracle (realized in experiments using a heuristic – see the next section) that can solve
weighted classification problems. Given access to such an oracle, oracle efficient algorithms
must run in polynomial time. We show that our fairness constrained learning problem is
computationally no harder than unconstrained learning by giving such an oracle efficient
algorithm (or reduction), and show moreover that its guarantees generalize from in-sample
to out-of-sample in the usual way – with respect to both accuracy and the frequency and
magnitude of fairness violations. Our algorithm is simple and amenable to implementation,
and we use it in our experimental results.
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Our Experimental Results
We implement our algorithm and run a set of experiments on the COMPAS recidivism
prediction dataset, using fairness constraints elicited from 43 human subjects. We establish
that our algorithm converges quickly (even when implemented with fast learning heuristics,
rather than “oracles”). We also explore the Pareto curves trading off error and fairness
violations for different human subjects, and find empirically that there is a great deal of
variability across subjects in terms of their conception of fairness, and in terms of the degree
to which their expressed preferences are in conflict with accurate prediction. We find that
most of the difficulty in balancing accuracy with the elicited fairness constraints can be
attributed to a small fraction of the constraints.
1.2 Related Work
Individual Fairness and Elicitation
Our work is related to existing notions of individual fairness like [17, 29] that conceptualize
fairness as a set of constraints binding on pairs of individuals. In particular, the notion of
metric fairness proposed in [17] is closely related, but distinct from the fairness notions we
elicit in this work. In particular: 1) We allow for constraints that require that individual
A be treated better than or equal to individual B, whereas metric fairness constraints are
symmetric, and only allow constraints of the form that A and B be treated similarly. In this
sense our notion is more general; 2) We elicit binary judgments between pairs of individuals,
whereas metric fairness is defined as a Lipschitz constraint on a real valued metric. In this
sense our notion is more restrictive. Though, we – along with a line of work on classification
with pairwise constraints – see merit in pairwise constraints because they “can be relatively
easy to collect from human feedback” [49, p. 114].
The most technically related piece of work is Rothblum and Yona [53], who first frame
individual fairness in a PAC learning setting and prove similar generalization guarantees
to ours for a relaxation of metric fairness. Our conceptual focus is quite different, however:
for general learning problems, they prove worst-case hardness results, whereas we derive
algorithms in the oracle-efficient model and evaluate them on real elicited user data. The
concurrent work of [41] makes a similar observation about guaranteeing fairness with respect
to an unknown metric, although their aim is the orthogonal goal of fair representation
learning.
Dwork et al. [17] first proposed the notion of individual metric-fairness that we take
inspiration from, imagining fairness as a Lipschitz constraint on a randomized algorithm,
with respect to some “task-specific metric”. Since the original proposal, the question of
where the metric should come from has been one of the primary obstacles to its adoption,
and the focus of subsequent work. Zemel et al. [67] attempt to automatically learn a
representation for the data (and hence, implicitly, a similarity metric) that causes a classifier
to label an equal proportion of two protected groups as positive. Kim et al. [35] consider a
group-fairness like relaxation of individual metric-fairness, asking that on average, individuals
in pre-specified groups are classified with probabilities proportional to the average distance
between individuals in those groups. They show how to learn such classifiers given access to
an oracle which can evaluate the distance between two individuals according to the metric.
Compared to our work, they assume the existence of a fairness metric which can be accessed
using a quantitative oracle, and they use this metric to define a statistical rather than
individual notion of fairness. Gillen et al. [23] assume access to an oracle which simply
identifies fairness violations across pairs of individuals. Under the assumption that the oracle
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is exactly consistent with a metric in a simple linear class, they give a polynomial time
algorithm to compete with the best fair policy in an online linear contextual bandits problem.
In contrast to [23], we make essentially no assumptions at all on the structure of the “fairness”
constraints. Bechavod et al. [8] generalize the setting of Gillen et al. [23] by making no
assumption on the underlying metric and reduce the number of calls to the fairness oracle.
Ilvento [28] studies the problem of metric learning with the goal of using only a small number
of numeric valued queries, which are hard for human beings to answer, relying more on
comparison queries. In contrast with [28], we do not attempt to learn a metric, and instead
directly learn a classifier consistent with the elicited pairwise fairness constraints.
Classification with Pairwise Constraints
Stretching back to at least Kleinberg and Tardos [37], there is a line of work that considers
classification problems with pairwise constraints which define similarity or dissimilarity
between the labels of two data points [49, 7, 49, 68, 6, 57]. Kleinberg and Tardos [37], for
example, introduce a classification problem with pairwise equality constraints and a distance
metric between pairs. The constraints we elicit differ in that they are asymmetric inequality
relations between pairs, rather than equality or metric constraints. Much of this work is
conceptually different from ours, as it is concerned with clustering and semi-supervised
learning, e.g. [7] or [6].
Preference Elicitation, Social Choice Theory, and Virtual Democracy
Preference elicitation is a well-established area in machine learning [52, 16]. Social choice
or voting theory aims to elicit and aggregate people’s preferences in order to find a winner
or ranking over alternatives (see [50] for an overview). The aim of this work is often to
suggest aggregation methods which meet some desirable criteria, such as strategyproofness.
Virtual democracy is a framework for eliciting normative preferences, constructing a model
from these preferences – typically via voting methods – in order to automate moral decision
making based on these norms [1, 51, 13, 46, 31, 5, 21]. Our work is conceptually similar: we
elicit and learn from moral preferences. However, our work differs in two regards: 1) We
focus specifically on fair classification, whereas virtual democracy is concerned with more
general moral decisions, e.g. the kind of trolley problem scenarios in the Moral Machine
experiment [5]; 2) As such, we can incorporate elicited preferences into a fair learning problem
rather than using voting methods to aggregate them.
Human Perspectives on Algorithmic Fairness
A number of recent qualitative and HCI works have focused on understanding perspectives
on algorithms and fairness from the public [25, 24, 56, 61, 62, 55] and from practitioners
[27, 47, 59]. These works suggest that 1) algorithms should incorporate stakeholder input
into the fairness principles they use and 2) these fairness principles are context-specific
[11, 15, 43, 44, 9, 54]. These works also offer a perspective on how explaining or asking
people about fairness influences how they respond [45, 64, 54, 9]. These works provide largely
qualitative findings, which may be difficult to translate into specific design implications. Our
work complements these prior works by offering a way to easily implement a fair algorithm
based on human perspectives.
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2 Problem Formulation
Let S denote a set of labeled examples {zi = (xi, yi)}ni=1, where xi ∈ X is a feature vector
and yi ∈ Y is a label. We will also write SX = {xi}ni=1 and SY = {yi}ni=1. Throughout
the paper, we will restrict attention to binary labels, so let Y = {0, 1}. Let P denote
the unknown distribution over X × Y. Let H denote a hypothesis class containing binary
classifiers h : X → Y . We assume that H contains a constant classifier (which will imply that
the “fairness constrained” ERM problem that we define is always feasible). We’ll denote
classification error of hypothesis h by err(h,P) := Pr(x,y)∼P(h(x) ̸= y) and its empirical
classification error by err(h, S) := 1n
∑n
i=1 1(h(xi) ̸= yi).
We assume there is a set of one or more stakeholders U , such that each stakeholder u ∈ U
is identified with a set of ordered pairs (x, x′) of individuals Cu ⊆ X 2: for each (x, x′) ∈ Cu,
stakeholder u thinks that x′ should be treated as well as x or better, i.e. ideally that for the
learned classifier h, the classification h(x′) ≥ h(x) (we will ask that this hold in expectation
if the classifier is randomized, and will relax it in various ways). For each ordered pair (x, x′),
let wx,x′ be the fraction of stakeholders who would like individual x to be treated as well
as x′: that is, wx,x′ = |{u|(x,x
′)∈Cu}|
|U| . Note that if (x, x
′) ∈ Cu and (x′, x) ∈ Cu, then the
stakeholder wants x and x′ to be treated similarly in that ideally h(x) = h(x′).
In practice, we will not have direct access to the sets of ordered pairs Cu corresponding
to the stakeholders u, but we may ask them whether particular ordered pairs are in this set
(see Section 5 for details about how we actually query human subjects). We model this by
imagining that we present each stakeholder with a random set of pairs A ⊆ [n]2, and for each
ordered pair (xi, xj), ask if xj should not be treated worse than xi; we learn the set of ordered
pairs in A ∩ Cu for each u. Define the empirical constraint set Ĉu = {(xi, xj) ∈ Cu}∀(i,j)∈A
and ŵxixj =
|{u|(x,x′)∈Ĉu}|
|U| , if (i, j) ∈ A and 0 otherwise. We write that Ĉ = ∪uĈu. For
brevity, we will sometimes write wij instead of wxi,xj . Note that ŵij = wij for every
(i, j) ∈ A.
Our goal will be to find the distribution over classifiers fromH that minimizes classification
error, while satisfying the stakeholders’ fairness preferences, captured by the constraints C.
To do so, we’ll try to find D, a probability distribution over H, that minimizes the training
error and satisfies the stakeholders’ empirical fairness constraints, Ĉ. For convenience, we
denote the expected classification error of D as err(D,P) := Eh∼D[err(h,P)] and likewise
its expected empirical classification error as err(D, S) := Eh∼D[err(h, S)]. We say that any
distribution D over classifiers satisfies (γ, η)-approximate subjective fairness if it is a feasible




such that ∀(i, j) ∈ [n]2 : E
h∼D





This “Fair ERM” problem, whose feasible region we denote by Ω(S, ŵ, γ, η), has decision
variables D and {αij}, representing the distribution over classifiers and the “fairness violation”
terms for each pair of training points, respectively. The parameters γ and η are constants
which represent the two different “knobs” we have at our disposal to quantitatively relax the
fairness constraint, in an ℓ∞ and ℓ1 sense, respectively.
The parameter γ defines, for any ordered pair (xi, xj), the maximum difference between
the probabilities that xi and xj receive positive labels without constituting a fairness
violation. The parameter αij captures the “excess fairness violation” beyond γ for (xi, xj).
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The parameter η upper bounds the sum of these allotted excess fairness violation terms αij ,
each weighted by the proportion of judges who perceive they ought to be treated similarly ŵij
and normalized with the total number of pairs presented |A|. Thus, η bounds the expected
degree of dissatisfaction of the panel of stakeholders U , over the random choice of an ordered
pair (xi, xj) ∈ A and the randomness of their classification. We iterate over all (i, j) ∈ [n]2
(not just those in Ĉ) because ŵij = 0 if no judge prefers xi should be classified as well as xj .
To better understand γ and η, we consider them in isolation. First, suppose we set γ = 0.
Then, any difference in probabilities of positive classification between pairs is deemed a
fairness violation. So, if we choose (D, {αij}) such that the sum of weighted differences in
positive classification probabilities exceeds η, i.e.∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
ŵij Eh∼ D[h(xi)− h(xj)]
|A|
> η,
then this is an infeasible solution. Second, suppose that η = 0. Then, for any (xi, xj) ∈ C (for
which ŵij > 0), if the expected difference in labels exceeds γ, i.e. Eh∼ D[h(xi)− h(xj)] > γ,
then this is an infeasible solution.
2.1 Fairness Loss
Our goal is to develop an algorithm that will minimize its empirical error err(D, S), while
satisfying the empirical fairness constraints Ĉ. The standard VC dimension argument states
that empirical classification error will concentrate around the true classification error: we
hope to show the same kind of generalization for fairness as well. To do so, we first define
fairness loss with respect to our elicited fairness preferences here.
For some fixed randomized hypothesis D ∈ ∆H and w, define γ-fairness loss be-
tween an ordered pair as ΠD,w,γ ((x, x′)) = wx,x′ max (0,Eh∼D [h(x)− h(x′)]− γ) . For




(x,x′)∈M ΠD,w,γ ((x, x′)) . This is the expected degree to which the difference in classi-
fication probability for a randomly selected pair exceeds the allowable budget γ, weighted by
the fraction of stakeholders who think that x′ should be treated as well as x. By construction,




|A| ≤ η), and we
show in Section 4, the empirical fairness should concentrate around the true fairness loss
ΠD,w,γ(P) := Ex,x′∼P2 [ΠD,w,γ(x, x′)].
2.2 Cost-sensitive Classification
In our algorithm, we will make use of a cost-sensitive classification (CSC) oracle. An
instance of CSC problem can be described by a set of costs {(xi, c0i , c1i )}ni=1 and a hy-
pothesis class, H. Costs c0i and c1i correspond to the cost of labeling xi as 0 and 1 re-





h(xi)c1i + (1− h(xi)) c0i
)
. We say that an algorithm is oracle-efficient
if it runs in polynomial time assuming access to a CSC oracle.
3 Empirical Risk Minimization
In this section, we give an oracle-efficient algorithm whose pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 1
for approximately solving our (in-sample) constrained empirical risk minimization problem.
Details are deferred to the full version of this paper which is available on arXiv [30]. We
prove the following theorem:
C. Jung, M. Kearns, S. Neel, A. Roth, L. Stapleton, and Z. S. Wu 2:9
Algorithm 1 No-Regret Dynamics.
Input: training examples {xi, yi}ni=1, bounds Cλ and Cτ , time horizon T , step sizes µλ
and {µtτ}t=1T ,
Set θ01 = 0 ∈ Rn
2
Set τ0 = 0
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do








for all pairs (i, j) ∈ [n]2
Set τ t = proj[0,Cτ ]
(









Dt, αt ← BESTρ(λt, τ t)
for (i, j) ∈ [n]2 do













▶ Theorem 1. Fix parameters ν, Cτ , Cλ that serve to trade off running time with approx-








oracle calls and outputs a solution (D̂, α̂) with the following guarantee. The objective value
is approximately optimal:
err(D̂, S) ≤ min
(D,α)∈Ω(S,ŵ,γ,η)
err(D, S) + 2ν.










3.1 Outline of the Solution
We frame the problem of solving our constrained ERM problem (equations (1) through (3))
as finding an approximate equilibrium of a zero-sum game between a primal player and a
dual player, trying to minimize and maximize respectively the Lagrangian of the constrained
optimization problem.
The Lagrangian for our optimization problem is
















For the constraint in equation (2), corresponding to the γ-fairness violation for each
ordered pair of individuals (xi, xj), we introduce a dual variable λij . For the constraint (3),
which corresponds to the η-fairness violation over all pairs of individuals, we introduce
a dual variable of τ . For brevity, we define vectors λ ∈ Λ and α which are made up of
all the multipliers λij and the excess fairness violation allotments αij , respectively. The
primary player’s action space is (D, α) ∈ (∆H, [0, 1]n2), and the dual player’s action space is
(λ, τ) ∈ (Rn2 ,R).
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L(D, α, λ, τ)









L(D, α, λ, τ).
By a classic result of Freund and Schapire [22], one can compute an approximate equilib-
rium by simulating “no-regret” dynamics between the primal and dual player. “No-regret”
meaning that the average regret –or difference between our algorithm’s plays and the single
best play in hindsight– is bounded above by a term that converges to zero with increasing
rounds.
In our case, we define a zero-sum game wherein the primary player’s plays from action space
(D, α) ∈ (∆H, [0, 1]n2), and the dual player’s plays from action space (λ, τ) ∈ (Rn2≥0,R≥0). In
any given round t, the dual player plays first and the primal second. The primal player can
simply best respond to the dual player (see Algorithm 2).
However, since the dual player plays first, they cannot simply best respond to the primal
player’s action. The dual player has to anticipate the primal player’s best response in order
to figure out what to play. Ideally, the dual player would enumerate every possible primal
play and calculate the best dual response. However, this is intractable. So, the dual player
updates dual variables {λ, τ} according to no-regret learning algorithms (exponentiated
gradient descent [36] and online gradient descent [69], respectively).
The time-averaged play of both players converges to an approximate equilibrium of the
zero-sum game, where the approximation is controlled by the regret of the dual player. This
approximate equilibrium corresponds to an approximate saddle point for the Lagrangian L,
which is equivalent to an approximate solution to the Fair ERM problem.
We organize the rest of this section as follows. First, for simplicity, we show how the
primal player updates {D, α} (even though the dual player plays first). Second, we show how
the dual player updates {λ, τ}. Finally, we prove that these updates are no-regret and relate
the regret of the dual player to the approximation of the solution to the Fair ERM problem.
3.2 The Primal Player’s Best Response
In each round t, given the actions chosen by the dual player (λt, τ t), the primal player needs to
best respond by choosing (Dt, αt) such that (Dt, αt) ∈ argminD∈∆H,α∈[0,1]n2 L(D, α, λt, τ t).
We can separate the optimization problem into two as shown above in Algorithm 2: one
optimization over hypothesis D and one over violation factor α. As for Dt, the primal player





Eh∼D [1(yi ̸= 0)] , c1i =
1
n
Eh∼D [1 (yi ̸= 1)] + (λtij − λtji).
Then, Dt = ht = CSC
(
{(xi, c0i , c1i )}ni=1
)
(we note that the best response is always a
deterministic classifier ht).




ij ≤ 0 and 0
otherwise. We defer its derivation and proofs to the full version of this paper which is
available on arXiv [30].
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Algorithm 2 Best Response, BESTρ(λ, τ), for the primal player.
Input: training examples S = {xi, yi}ni=1, λ ∈ Λ, τ ∈ T , CSC oracle CSC
for i = 1, . . . , n do
if yi = 0 then
Set c0i = 0
Set c1i = 1n +
∑
j ̸=i λij − λji
else
Set c0i = 1n
Set c1i =
∑
j ̸=i λij − λji
D = CSC(S, c)
for (i, j) ∈ [n]2 do
αij =
{
1 : τ wij|A| − λij ≤ 0
0 : τ wij|A| − λij > 0.
Output: D, α
3.3 The Dual Player’s No-regret Updates
In order to reason about convergence, we need to restrict the dual player’s action space
to lie within a bounded ℓ1 ball, defined by the parameters Cτ and Cλ that appear in
our theorem – and serve to trade off running time with approximation quality: Λ ={
λ ∈ Rn2+ : ∥λ∥1 ≤ Cλ
}
, T = {τ ∈ R+ : ∥τ∥1 ≤ Cτ} . The dual player will use exponentiated
gradient descent [36] to update λ and online gradient descent [69] to update τ , where the




ij (Eh∼D [h(xi)− h(xj)]− αij − γ)





(i,j)∈[n]2 wijαij − η
)
. We defer its derivation and proofs to the full
version of this paper which is available on arXiv [30].
4 Generalization
In this section, we show that fairness loss generalizes out-of-sample. (Error generalization
follows from the standard VC-dimension bound, which – because it is a uniform convergece
statement is unaffected by the addition of fairness constraints. See the supplement for the
standard statement.)
Proving that the fairness loss generalizes doesn’t follow immediately from a standard
VC-dimension argument for several reasons: it is not linearly separable, but defined as
an average over non-disjoint pairs of individuals in the sample. The difference between
empirical fairness loss and true fairness loss of a randomized hypothesis D ∈ ∆H is also a
non-convex function of the supporting hypotheses h, and so it is not sufficient to prove a
uniform convergence bound merely for the base hypotheses in our hypothesis class H. We
circumvent these difficulties by making use of an ε-net argument, together with an application
of a concentration inequality, and an application of Sauer’s lemma. Briefly, we show that
with respect to fairness loss, the continuous set of distributions over classifiers have an ε-net
of sparse distributions. Using the two-sample trick and Sauer’s lemma, we can bound the
number of such sparse distributions. The end result is the following generalization theorem:
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▶ Theorem 2. Let S consists of n i.i.d points drawn from P and let M represent a set of m































where k′ = 2 ln(2m)ε2 + 1, k =
ln(2n2)
8ε2 + 1, and d is the VC-dimension of H.
To interpret this theorem, note that the right hand side (the probability of a failure of
generalization) begins decreasing exponentially fast in the data and fairness constraint sample
parameters n and m as soon as n ≥ Ω(d log(n) log(n/d)) and m ≥ Ω(d log(m) log(n/d)).
5 A Behavioral Study
The framework and algorithm we have provided can be viewed as a tool to elicit and enforce
a notion of fairness defined by a collection of stakeholders. In this section, we describe
preliminary results from a human-subject study we performed in which pairwise fairness
preferences were elicited and enforced by our algorithm. We note that the subjects included
in our empirical study were not stakeholders affected by the algorithm we used (the COMPAS
algorithm). Thus, our results should not be interpreted as cogent for any policy modifications
to the COMPAS algorithm. We instead report our empirical findings primarily to showcase
the performance of our algorithm and to act as a template for what should be reported if
our framework were applied with relevant stakeholders (for example, if fairness preferences
about COMPAS data were elicited from inmates).4
5.1 Data
Our study used the COMPAS recidivism data gathered by ProPublica 5 in their celebrated
analysis of Northepointe’s risk assessment algorithm [42]. This data consists of defendants
from Broward County in Florida between 2013 to 2014. For each defendant the data consists
of sex (male, female), age (18-96), race (African-American, Caucasian, Hispanic, Asian,
Native American), juvenile felony count, juvenile misdemeanor count, number of other
juvenile offenses, number of prior adult criminal offenses, the severity of the crime for which
they were incarcerated (felony or misdemeanor), as well as the outcome of whether or not
they did in fact recidivate. Recidivism is defined as a new arrest within 2 years, not counting
traffic violations and municipal ordinance violations.
5.2 Subjective Fairness Elicitation
We implemented our fairness framework via a web app that elicited subjective fairness notions
from 43 undergraduates at a major research university. After reading a document describing
the data and recidivism prediction task, each subject was presented with 50 randomly chosen
4 We omit such an empirical study due to the difficulty of accessing such stakeholders and leave this for
future work.
5 The data can be accessed on ProPublica’s Github page here. We cleaned the data as in the ProPublica
study, removing any records with missing data. This left 5829 records, where the base rate of two-year
recidivism was 46%.
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Figure 1 Screenshot of sample subjective fairness elicitation question posed to human subjects.
pairs of records from the COMPAS data set and asked whether in their opinion the two
individuals should treated (predicted) equally or not. Importantly, the subjects were shown
only the features for the individuals, and not their actual recidivism outcomes, since we
sought to elicit subjects’ fairness notions regarding the predictions of those outcomes. While
absolutely no guidance was given to subjects regarding fairness, the elicitation framework
allows for rich possibilities. For example, subjects could choose to ignore demographic factors
or criminal histories entirely if they liked, or a subject who believes that minorities are more
vulnerable to overpolicing could discount their criminal histories relative to Caucasians in
their pairwise elicitations.
For each subject, the pairs they identified to be treated equally were taken as constraints
on error minimization with respect to the actual recidivism outcomes over the entire COMPAS
dataset, and our algorithm was applied to solve this constrained optimization problem, using
a linear threshold heuristic as the underlying learning oracle [33]. We ran our algorithm with
η = 0 and variable γ in Equations (1) through (3), which represents the strongest enforcement
of subjective fairness – the difference in predicted values must be at most γ on every pair
selected by a subject. Because the issues we are most interested in here (convergence, tradeoffs
with accuracy, and heterogeneity of fairness preferences) are orthogonal to generalization
– and because we prove VC-dimension based generalization theorems – for simplicity, the
results we report are in-sample.
5.3 Results
Since our algorithm relies on a learning heuristic for which worst-case guarantees are not
possible, the first empirical question is whether the algorithm converges rapidly on the
behavioral data. We found that it did so consistently; a typical example is Figure 2a, where
we show the trajectories of model error vs. fairness violation for a particular subject’s data
for variable values of the input γ (horizontal lines). After 1000 iterations, the algorithm has
converged to the optimal errors subject to the allowed γ.
Perhaps the most basic behavioral questions we might ask involve the extent and nature
of subject variability. For example, do some subjects identify constraint pairs that are much
harder to satisfy than other subjects? And if so, what factors seem to account for such
variation?
Figure 2b shows that there is indeed considerable variation in subject difficulty. For each
of the 43 subjects, we have plotted the error vs. fairness violation Pareto curves obtained by
varying γ from 0 (pairs selected by subjects must have identical probabilistic predictions of
recidivism) to 1.0 (no fairness enforced whatsoever). Since our model space is closed under
probabilistic mixtures, the worst-case Pareto curve is linear, obtained by all mixtures of the





Figure 2 (a) Sample algorithm trajectory for a particular subject at various γ. (b) Sample
subjective fairness Pareto curves for a sample of subjects. (c) Scatterplot of number of constraints
specified and number of opposing constraints vs. error at γ = 0.3. (d) Scatterplot of number of
constraints where the true labels are different vs. error at γ = 0.3. (e) Correlation between false
positive rate difference and γ for racial groups.
in the figure that both extremes are exhibited behaviorally – some subjects yield linear or
near-linear curves, while others permit huge reductions in unfairness for only slight increases
in error, and virtually all the possibilities in between are realized as well. 6
Since each subject was presented with 50 random pairs and was free to constrain as many
or as few as they wished, it is natural to wonder if the variation in difficulty is explained
simply by the number of constraints chosen. In Figure 2c we show a scatterplot of the the
number of constraints selected by a subject (x axis) versus the error obtained (y axis) for
γ = 0.3 (an intermediate value that exhibits considerable variation in subject error rates) for
all 43 subjects. While we see there is indeed strong correlation (approximately 0.69), it is
far from the case that the number of constraints explains all the variability. For example,
amongst subjects who selected approximately 16 constraints, the resulting error varies over a
range of nearly 8%, which is over 40% of the range from the optimal error (0.32) to the worst
fairness-constrained error (0.5). More surprisingly, when we consider only the “opposing”
constraints, pairs of points with different true labels, the correlation (0.489) seems to be
weaker. Enforcing a classifier to predict similarly on a pair of points with different true labels
should increase the error, and yet, it is less correlated with error than the raw number of
constraints. This suggests that the variability in subject difficulty is due to the nature of the
constraints themselves rather than their number or disagreement with the true labels.
It is also interesting to consider the collective force of the 1432 constraints selected by
all 43 subjects together, which we can view as a “fairness panel” of sorts. Given that there
are already individual subjects whose constraints yield the worst-case Pareto curve, it is
unsurprising that the collective constraints do as well. But we can exploit the flexibility of
our optimization framework in Equations (1) through constraint (3), and let γ = 0.0 and
vary only η, thus giving the learner discretion in which subjects’ constraints to discount
or discard at a given budget η. In doing so we find that the unconstrained optimal error
6 The slight deviations from true convexity are due to approximate rather than exact convergence.
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can be obtained while having the average (exact) pairwise constraint be violated by only
roughly 25%, meaning roughly that only 25% of the collective constraints account for all the
difficulty.
Finally, we can investigate the extent to which behavioral subjective fairness notions align
with more standard statistical fairness definitions, such as equality of false positive rates.
For instance, for each subject and a pair of racial groups, we take the absolute difference
in false positive rates of the classifier at γ ∈ {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 1.0} and calculate the correlation
coefficient between realized values of γ (which measure violation of subjective unfairness)
and the false positive rate differences. Figure 2e shows the average correlation coefficient
across subjects for each pair of racial groups. We note that subjective fairness correlates
with a smaller gap between the false positive rates across Caucasians and African Americans:
but correlates substantially less for other pairs of racial groups.
We leave a more complete investigation of our behavioral study for future work, including
the detailed nature of subject variability and further comparison of behavioral subjective
fairness to standard algorithmic fairness notions.
6 Discussion and Limitations
We provide a framework to involve non-technical stakeholders into the process of defining
algorithmic fairness. Our approach offers a means for stakeholders to encode their more
nuanced, contextual principles of fairness into a model. By eliciting pairwise fairness
preferences, our approach is designed to be easily understood by laypeople, even if they do
not understand the technicalities of the learning algorithm. We provide theoretical guarantees,
as well as preliminary experiments to demonstrate the functionality of our algorithm.
Here, we anticipate a criticism: biases may be embedded into the model if the stakeholders
we elicit from are biased. To address this, we clarify that our approach aims to easily elicit
and operationalize what stakeholders think is fair and unbiased. As such, if stakeholders
truthfully report their preferences, then our approach should produce a model which these
stakeholders believe is unbiased. In this sense, we consider what is biased and what is fair
in our context to be subjective. While this point of view may be uncomfortable within the
algorithmic fairness community, it is a well-established argument within ethics and normative
economics [38]. Furthermore, if the design goal is for the model to achieve some objective
standard of neutrality, then we believe this should be addressed at the level of choosing which
stakeholders to elicit from and how they are elicited – see Section 1.2 for related qualitative
and HCI works which consider how to elicit fairness preferences from people. We consider
this to be an important direction for future work.7
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A Missing Details And Proofs
We defer all the missing details and proofs to the full version of this paper which is available
on arXiv [30].
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